单项选择题

From its birth, three powerful images have coloured ideas of what the United States was and what it stood for. One was "a city on a hill", a model commonwealth for the rest of humankind. Another, in Walt Whitman’s phrase, was a "teeming nation of nations": a near-empty continent of immigration and fresh starts. A third, given currency by Alexis de Tocqueville in 1831, was of a new and exceptional kind of society not bound by prevailing rules of history. Each picture stresses what makes America different from other countries. Thomas Bender, a professor of history and humanities at New York University, wants us to focus instead on what makes the United States the same. More exactly, he is urging us to re-think key episodes in America’s past by relating them to what was happening elsewhere in the world. The United States, he suggests, is less of a nation apart than super-patriots or America-haters might want to believe. His aim is not to belittle the American achievement but to break the habit of treating it as a virtually isolated feat of self-creation. National histories, he argues, are always local responses to broader trends, and to that rule the United States is no exception. Five episodes form the core of this challenging essay. "The Ocean World" contrasts the conventional account of American beginnings, which stresses political ideals, religious freedom and economic opportunity, with a wider view that brings in sea-borne trade and slavery. Next, Mr. Bender treats the American Revolution as a by-product of the "great war" mat France and Britain fought off and on throughout the 18th century until the defeat of Napoleon in 1815. The American civil war (1861-1865) becomes part of the democratic era of nation building that began with the European revolutions of 1848. The United States did not join Europe’s scramble for empire at the end of the 19th century as a colonising power. But it fought a terrible war to control the Philippines, set a pattern of intervention in its own hemisphere and in Asia, and established a doctrine of untrammeled sea power that survives to this day. For his fifth episode, Mr. Bender likens the progressive social reforms of the 1890s onwards to changes Europeans also made to temper the free market. The breadth of view is exhilarating, and the reading daunting in scope. Mr. Bender dots his essay with awkward reminders that the American past was not a smooth, inevitable rise to superpowerdom and moral beaconhood. Yet "A Nation Among Nations" suffers from an ambiguity of aim. At several points Mr. Bender talks of a global story in which the United States has a local part. What is that story He does not say. This is not his fault. Only the rashest of historians would nowadays dream of telling us, Hegel-wise, where the spirit of world history had come from and where it was headed. Nor is gesturing towards "global trends" much help: ocean trade, nationalism and democracy, for example, are such broad categories they explain little of the local variation that puzzles us, especially when the locale is the United States, with its oddities—a high birth rate and strong religions, for example—that modern states are supposed not to have. For the rest, Mr. Bender is more modest, and more successful. American failures and successes are usually so large it is easy to forget that they are seldom unique or insulated from events elsewhere. The simple-sounding truth that the United States never was, and never could be, isolated from the world is worth repeating, and Mr. Bender repeats it well.The sentence " The United States, he suggests, is less of a nation apart than super-patriots or America-haters might want to believe" (Para. 2) suggests that______.

A.America is not as strong a country as you might think
B.America is the result of self creation
C.America is also local response to broader trends
D.He tries to set up a connection between the United States and other countries
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In this season of celebrity babies, with the coming of Baby Suri, Tom and Katie’s new addition, and Gwyneth’s Baby Moses and the imminent arrival of Baby Brangelina, I can’t help wonder how these parents handle the insatiable public curiosity about this most profoundly personal event, as they head home from the hospital, in Tom and Katie’s case, to find seven satellite trucks parked outside, and a lemonade stand. We are used to beautiful weddings being celebrated in the pages of People and In Style, and ugly divorces scorching the pages of the tabloids. But there is something so different about childbirth that it makes me wonder whether, just this once, the famous parents should crawl into a very private hole and pull it in after them, rather than sending Diane Sawyer an e-mail telling all about it. (Maybe this is one reason Angelina Jolie was heading off to a secluded resort in Namibia as her due date approached.) A wedding can be a beautiful and blessed day; but the most perfect romance scripted into the most storybook ceremony does not have the spirit of raw astonishment that childbirth has. You are in control of your wedding; you have planned and listed and catered and crafted every detail, and if you are a celebrity you have the help of an army of event planners to make sure that the cake rises and the willows weep and everything goes according to plan. But you can’t do that with childbirth. You can eat right, practice breathing, prepare the nursery, try out names, pack the hospital bag with non-slip socks and lollipops (to keep your mouth moist) and tennis balls (for a counterpressure back massage). But this is mainly about creating the illusion of control. Once it starts, once the contractions begin, once the baby launches towards delivery, the momentum heads in the opposite direction, towards mystery, not management, and chaos, not control. However calm the doctors and however smooth the delivery, this is still a moment to marvel. It is when you feel both most unique, as though you are the first person ever to have done this, and most united with everyone else, because people have been having babies as long as there have been people. The very ordinariness of the experience is one of the most extraordinary things about it. And then you are left, belly tender, breasts leaking, veins visible from the effort, sweaty, exhausted and astounded at what you are holding. Where did YOU come from Who ARE you, you ask this very small human, who has been living with you, in you, for the past nine months and yet who now seems suddenly so new and alien and separate, her own body, her own soul. Hello. Nice to see you. Let me sing you a quiet song. There can be few more precious or private moments than this. It is not a natural place for strangers to enter, or press handlers or paparazzi. For just a little while at least, you would think a brand new little family would want more than anything to be left alone and be mammals together and feel safe, protected. I can’t imagine what it would be like to have the world waiting right outside. Maybe by the time you’ve lived under the lights this long you are used to it. But nothing can really prepare you for what it feels like to walk into a hospital as a patient and walk out as a parent. It makes a normal person feel like a celebrity: I’ve just done this incredible thing. I wonder if maybe it also makes a celebrity feel, just once, strangely normal.The word "insatiable" in the sentence "...I can’t help wonder how these parents handle the insatiable public curiosity about this most profoundly personal event..." (Para.l) can best be replaced by______.

A.pleasant
B.breathtaking
C.notorious
D.impossible to satisfy
单项选择题

In this season of celebrity babies, with the coming of Baby Suri, Tom and Katie’s new addition, and Gwyneth’s Baby Moses and the imminent arrival of Baby Brangelina, I can’t help wonder how these parents handle the insatiable public curiosity about this most profoundly personal event, as they head home from the hospital, in Tom and Katie’s case, to find seven satellite trucks parked outside, and a lemonade stand. We are used to beautiful weddings being celebrated in the pages of People and In Style, and ugly divorces scorching the pages of the tabloids. But there is something so different about childbirth that it makes me wonder whether, just this once, the famous parents should crawl into a very private hole and pull it in after them, rather than sending Diane Sawyer an e-mail telling all about it. (Maybe this is one reason Angelina Jolie was heading off to a secluded resort in Namibia as her due date approached.) A wedding can be a beautiful and blessed day; but the most perfect romance scripted into the most storybook ceremony does not have the spirit of raw astonishment that childbirth has. You are in control of your wedding; you have planned and listed and catered and crafted every detail, and if you are a celebrity you have the help of an army of event planners to make sure that the cake rises and the willows weep and everything goes according to plan. But you can’t do that with childbirth. You can eat right, practice breathing, prepare the nursery, try out names, pack the hospital bag with non-slip socks and lollipops (to keep your mouth moist) and tennis balls (for a counterpressure back massage). But this is mainly about creating the illusion of control. Once it starts, once the contractions begin, once the baby launches towards delivery, the momentum heads in the opposite direction, towards mystery, not management, and chaos, not control. However calm the doctors and however smooth the delivery, this is still a moment to marvel. It is when you feel both most unique, as though you are the first person ever to have done this, and most united with everyone else, because people have been having babies as long as there have been people. The very ordinariness of the experience is one of the most extraordinary things about it. And then you are left, belly tender, breasts leaking, veins visible from the effort, sweaty, exhausted and astounded at what you are holding. Where did YOU come from Who ARE you, you ask this very small human, who has been living with you, in you, for the past nine months and yet who now seems suddenly so new and alien and separate, her own body, her own soul. Hello. Nice to see you. Let me sing you a quiet song. There can be few more precious or private moments than this. It is not a natural place for strangers to enter, or press handlers or paparazzi. For just a little while at least, you would think a brand new little family would want more than anything to be left alone and be mammals together and feel safe, protected. I can’t imagine what it would be like to have the world waiting right outside. Maybe by the time you’ve lived under the lights this long you are used to it. But nothing can really prepare you for what it feels like to walk into a hospital as a patient and walk out as a parent. It makes a normal person feel like a celebrity: I’ve just done this incredible thing. I wonder if maybe it also makes a celebrity feel, just once, strangely normal.The purpose of the second paragraph is______.

A.to describe the superlativeness of weddings
B.to be a prelude to a dramatic contrast between a wedding and labor practice
C.to explain why Angelina Jolie was heading off to a secluded resort in Namibia
D.to be a summary of the article
单项选择题

Fifty years ago, Robert Solow published the first of two papers on economic growth that eventually won him a Nobel prize. Celebrated and seasoned, he was thus a natural choice to serve on an independent "commission on growth" announced last month by the World Bank. (The commission will weigh and sift what is known about growth, and what might be done to boost it.)Natural, that is, except for anyone who takes his 1956 contribution literally. For, according to the model he laid out in that article, the efforts of policymakers to raise the rate of growth per head are ultimately futile. A government eager to force the pace of economic advance may be tempted by savings drives, tax cuts, investment subsidies or even population controls. As a result of these measures, each member of the labour force may enjoy more capital to work with. But this process of "capital deepening", as economists call it, eventually runs into diminishing returns. Giving a worker a second computer does not double his output. Accumulation alone cannot yield lasting progress, Mr. Solow showed. What can Anything that allows the economy to add to its output without necessarily adding more labour and capital. Mr. Solow labeled this font of wealth "technological progress" in 1956, and measured its importance in 1957. But in neither paper did he explain where it came from or how it could be accelerated. Invention, innovation and ingenuity were all "exogenous" influences, lying outside the remit of his theory. To practical men of action, Mr. Solow’s model was thus an impossible tease: what it illuminated did not ultimately matter; and what really mattered, it did little to illuminate. The law of diminishing returns holds great sway over the economic imagination. But its writ has not gone unchallenged. A fascinating new book, Knowledge and the Wealth of Nations by David Warsh, tells the story of the rebel economics of increasing returns. A veteran observer of dismal scientists at work, first at the Boston Globe and now in an online column called Economic Principals, Mr. Warsh has written the best book of its kind since Peter Bernstein’s Capital Ideas.Diminishing returns ensure that firms cannot grow too big, preserving competition between them. This, in turn, allows the invisible hand of the market to perform its magic. But, as Mr. Warsh makes clear, the fealty economists show to this principle is as much mathematical as philosophical. The topology of diminishing returns is easy for economists to navigate: a landscape of declining gradients and single peaks, free of the treacherous craters and crevasses that might otherwise entrap them. The hero of the second half of Mr. Warsh’s book is Paul Romer, of Stanford University, who took up the challenge ducked by Mr. Solow. If technological progress dictates economic growth, what kind of economics governs technological advance In a series of papers, culminating in an article in the Journal of Political Economy in 1990, Mr. Romer tried to make technology "endogenous", to explain it within the terms of his model. In doing so, he steered growth theory out of the comfortable cul-de-sac in which Mr. Solow had so neatly parked it. The escape required a three-point turn. First, Mr. Romer assumed that ideas were goods—of a particular kind. Ideas, unlike things, are "non-rival": Everyone can make use of a single design, recipe or blueprint at the same time. This turn in the argument led to a second: the fabrication of ideas enjoys increasing returns to scale. Expensive to produce, they are cheap, almost costless, to reproduce. Thus the total cost of a design does not change much, whether it is used by one person or by a million. Blessed with increasing returns, the manufacture of ideas might seem like a good business to go into. Actually, the opposite is true. If the business is free to enter, it is not worth doing so, because competition pares the price of a design down to the negligible cost of reproducing it. Unless idea factories can enjoy some measure of monopoly over their designs—by patenting them, copyrighting them, or just keeping them secret—they will not be able to cover the fixed cost of inventing them. That was the final turn in Mr. Romer’s new theory of growth. How much guidance do these theories offer to policymakers, such as those sitting on the World Bank’s commission In Mr. Solow’s model, according to a common caricature, technology falls like "manna from heaven", leaving the bank’s commissioners with little to do but pray. Mr. Romer’s theory, by contrast, calls for a more worldly response: educate people, subsidies their research, import ideas from abroad, carefully gauge the protection offered to intellectual property. But did policymakers need Mr. Romer’s model to reveal the importance of such things Mr. Solow has expressed doubts. Despite the caricature, he did not intend in his 1956 model to deny that innovation is often dearly bought and profit-driven. The question is whether anything useful can be said about that process at the level of the economy as a whole. That question has yet to be answered definitively. In particular, Mr. Solow worries that some of the "more powerful conclusions" of the new growth theory are unearned, flowing as they do from powerful assumptions. At one point in Mr. Warsh’s book, Mr. Romer is quoted comparing the building of economic models to writing poetry. It is a triumph of form as much as content. This creative economist did not discover anything new about the world with his 1990 paper on growth. Rather, he extended the metre and rhyme-scheme of economics to capture a world—the knowledge economy—expressed until then only in the loosest kind of doggerel. That is how economics makes progress. Sadly, it does not, in and of itself, help economies make progress.The sentence "Giving a worker a second computer does not double his output." (Para. 3) can be best interpreted as______.

A.the measures adopted by the government are not effective at all
B.having more capital to work with is not necessarily effective
C.workers needs more than computers to achieve productivity
D.capital deepening leads to efficiency
单项选择题

In this season of celebrity babies, with the coming of Baby Suri, Tom and Katie’s new addition, and Gwyneth’s Baby Moses and the imminent arrival of Baby Brangelina, I can’t help wonder how these parents handle the insatiable public curiosity about this most profoundly personal event, as they head home from the hospital, in Tom and Katie’s case, to find seven satellite trucks parked outside, and a lemonade stand. We are used to beautiful weddings being celebrated in the pages of People and In Style, and ugly divorces scorching the pages of the tabloids. But there is something so different about childbirth that it makes me wonder whether, just this once, the famous parents should crawl into a very private hole and pull it in after them, rather than sending Diane Sawyer an e-mail telling all about it. (Maybe this is one reason Angelina Jolie was heading off to a secluded resort in Namibia as her due date approached.) A wedding can be a beautiful and blessed day; but the most perfect romance scripted into the most storybook ceremony does not have the spirit of raw astonishment that childbirth has. You are in control of your wedding; you have planned and listed and catered and crafted every detail, and if you are a celebrity you have the help of an army of event planners to make sure that the cake rises and the willows weep and everything goes according to plan. But you can’t do that with childbirth. You can eat right, practice breathing, prepare the nursery, try out names, pack the hospital bag with non-slip socks and lollipops (to keep your mouth moist) and tennis balls (for a counterpressure back massage). But this is mainly about creating the illusion of control. Once it starts, once the contractions begin, once the baby launches towards delivery, the momentum heads in the opposite direction, towards mystery, not management, and chaos, not control. However calm the doctors and however smooth the delivery, this is still a moment to marvel. It is when you feel both most unique, as though you are the first person ever to have done this, and most united with everyone else, because people have been having babies as long as there have been people. The very ordinariness of the experience is one of the most extraordinary things about it. And then you are left, belly tender, breasts leaking, veins visible from the effort, sweaty, exhausted and astounded at what you are holding. Where did YOU come from Who ARE you, you ask this very small human, who has been living with you, in you, for the past nine months and yet who now seems suddenly so new and alien and separate, her own body, her own soul. Hello. Nice to see you. Let me sing you a quiet song. There can be few more precious or private moments than this. It is not a natural place for strangers to enter, or press handlers or paparazzi. For just a little while at least, you would think a brand new little family would want more than anything to be left alone and be mammals together and feel safe, protected. I can’t imagine what it would be like to have the world waiting right outside. Maybe by the time you’ve lived under the lights this long you are used to it. But nothing can really prepare you for what it feels like to walk into a hospital as a patient and walk out as a parent. It makes a normal person feel like a celebrity: I’ve just done this incredible thing. I wonder if maybe it also makes a celebrity feel, just once, strangely normal.The sentence "because people have been having babies as long as there have been people" (Para. 3) can be interpreted as______.

A.people give birth only when there were human beings
B.celebrities feel part of ordinary people when they do the same thing as commons
C.they can feel unique giving birth
D.celebrities prefer not to give birth
单项选择题

Fifty years ago, Robert Solow published the first of two papers on economic growth that eventually won him a Nobel prize. Celebrated and seasoned, he was thus a natural choice to serve on an independent "commission on growth" announced last month by the World Bank. (The commission will weigh and sift what is known about growth, and what might be done to boost it.)Natural, that is, except for anyone who takes his 1956 contribution literally. For, according to the model he laid out in that article, the efforts of policymakers to raise the rate of growth per head are ultimately futile. A government eager to force the pace of economic advance may be tempted by savings drives, tax cuts, investment subsidies or even population controls. As a result of these measures, each member of the labour force may enjoy more capital to work with. But this process of "capital deepening", as economists call it, eventually runs into diminishing returns. Giving a worker a second computer does not double his output. Accumulation alone cannot yield lasting progress, Mr. Solow showed. What can Anything that allows the economy to add to its output without necessarily adding more labour and capital. Mr. Solow labeled this font of wealth "technological progress" in 1956, and measured its importance in 1957. But in neither paper did he explain where it came from or how it could be accelerated. Invention, innovation and ingenuity were all "exogenous" influences, lying outside the remit of his theory. To practical men of action, Mr. Solow’s model was thus an impossible tease: what it illuminated did not ultimately matter; and what really mattered, it did little to illuminate. The law of diminishing returns holds great sway over the economic imagination. But its writ has not gone unchallenged. A fascinating new book, Knowledge and the Wealth of Nations by David Warsh, tells the story of the rebel economics of increasing returns. A veteran observer of dismal scientists at work, first at the Boston Globe and now in an online column called Economic Principals, Mr. Warsh has written the best book of its kind since Peter Bernstein’s Capital Ideas.Diminishing returns ensure that firms cannot grow too big, preserving competition between them. This, in turn, allows the invisible hand of the market to perform its magic. But, as Mr. Warsh makes clear, the fealty economists show to this principle is as much mathematical as philosophical. The topology of diminishing returns is easy for economists to navigate: a landscape of declining gradients and single peaks, free of the treacherous craters and crevasses that might otherwise entrap them. The hero of the second half of Mr. Warsh’s book is Paul Romer, of Stanford University, who took up the challenge ducked by Mr. Solow. If technological progress dictates economic growth, what kind of economics governs technological advance In a series of papers, culminating in an article in the Journal of Political Economy in 1990, Mr. Romer tried to make technology "endogenous", to explain it within the terms of his model. In doing so, he steered growth theory out of the comfortable cul-de-sac in which Mr. Solow had so neatly parked it. The escape required a three-point turn. First, Mr. Romer assumed that ideas were goods—of a particular kind. Ideas, unlike things, are "non-rival": Everyone can make use of a single design, recipe or blueprint at the same time. This turn in the argument led to a second: the fabrication of ideas enjoys increasing returns to scale. Expensive to produce, they are cheap, almost costless, to reproduce. Thus the total cost of a design does not change much, whether it is used by one person or by a million. Blessed with increasing returns, the manufacture of ideas might seem like a good business to go into. Actually, the opposite is true. If the business is free to enter, it is not worth doing so, because competition pares the price of a design down to the negligible cost of reproducing it. Unless idea factories can enjoy some measure of monopoly over their designs—by patenting them, copyrighting them, or just keeping them secret—they will not be able to cover the fixed cost of inventing them. That was the final turn in Mr. Romer’s new theory of growth. How much guidance do these theories offer to policymakers, such as those sitting on the World Bank’s commission In Mr. Solow’s model, according to a common caricature, technology falls like "manna from heaven", leaving the bank’s commissioners with little to do but pray. Mr. Romer’s theory, by contrast, calls for a more worldly response: educate people, subsidies their research, import ideas from abroad, carefully gauge the protection offered to intellectual property. But did policymakers need Mr. Romer’s model to reveal the importance of such things Mr. Solow has expressed doubts. Despite the caricature, he did not intend in his 1956 model to deny that innovation is often dearly bought and profit-driven. The question is whether anything useful can be said about that process at the level of the economy as a whole. That question has yet to be answered definitively. In particular, Mr. Solow worries that some of the "more powerful conclusions" of the new growth theory are unearned, flowing as they do from powerful assumptions. At one point in Mr. Warsh’s book, Mr. Romer is quoted comparing the building of economic models to writing poetry. It is a triumph of form as much as content. This creative economist did not discover anything new about the world with his 1990 paper on growth. Rather, he extended the metre and rhyme-scheme of economics to capture a world—the knowledge economy—expressed until then only in the loosest kind of doggerel. That is how economics makes progress. Sadly, it does not, in and of itself, help economies make progress.According to the passage, which of the following is NOT true

A.The author holds that Solow’s 1956 contribution was a substantial feat.
B.Solow thinks that progress can be made with more labour and capital.
C.The author concludes that manufacture of ideas is not a good business to go into.
D.It is impossible to challenge the two articles Mr. Solow issued.
单项选择题

From its birth, three powerful images have coloured ideas of what the United States was and what it stood for. One was "a city on a hill", a model commonwealth for the rest of humankind. Another, in Walt Whitman’s phrase, was a "teeming nation of nations": a near-empty continent of immigration and fresh starts. A third, given currency by Alexis de Tocqueville in 1831, was of a new and exceptional kind of society not bound by prevailing rules of history. Each picture stresses what makes America different from other countries. Thomas Bender, a professor of history and humanities at New York University, wants us to focus instead on what makes the United States the same. More exactly, he is urging us to re-think key episodes in America’s past by relating them to what was happening elsewhere in the world. The United States, he suggests, is less of a nation apart than super-patriots or America-haters might want to believe. His aim is not to belittle the American achievement but to break the habit of treating it as a virtually isolated feat of self-creation. National histories, he argues, are always local responses to broader trends, and to that rule the United States is no exception. Five episodes form the core of this challenging essay. "The Ocean World" contrasts the conventional account of American beginnings, which stresses political ideals, religious freedom and economic opportunity, with a wider view that brings in sea-borne trade and slavery. Next, Mr. Bender treats the American Revolution as a by-product of the "great war" mat France and Britain fought off and on throughout the 18th century until the defeat of Napoleon in 1815. The American civil war (1861-1865) becomes part of the democratic era of nation building that began with the European revolutions of 1848. The United States did not join Europe’s scramble for empire at the end of the 19th century as a colonising power. But it fought a terrible war to control the Philippines, set a pattern of intervention in its own hemisphere and in Asia, and established a doctrine of untrammeled sea power that survives to this day. For his fifth episode, Mr. Bender likens the progressive social reforms of the 1890s onwards to changes Europeans also made to temper the free market. The breadth of view is exhilarating, and the reading daunting in scope. Mr. Bender dots his essay with awkward reminders that the American past was not a smooth, inevitable rise to superpowerdom and moral beaconhood. Yet "A Nation Among Nations" suffers from an ambiguity of aim. At several points Mr. Bender talks of a global story in which the United States has a local part. What is that story He does not say. This is not his fault. Only the rashest of historians would nowadays dream of telling us, Hegel-wise, where the spirit of world history had come from and where it was headed. Nor is gesturing towards "global trends" much help: ocean trade, nationalism and democracy, for example, are such broad categories they explain little of the local variation that puzzles us, especially when the locale is the United States, with its oddities—a high birth rate and strong religions, for example—that modern states are supposed not to have. For the rest, Mr. Bender is more modest, and more successful. American failures and successes are usually so large it is easy to forget that they are seldom unique or insulated from events elsewhere. The simple-sounding truth that the United States never was, and never could be, isolated from the world is worth repeating, and Mr. Bender repeats it well.The sentence " The United States, he suggests, is less of a nation apart than super-patriots or America-haters might want to believe" (Para. 2) suggests that______.

A.America is not as strong a country as you might think
B.America is the result of self creation
C.America is also local response to broader trends
D.He tries to set up a connection between the United States and other countries
单项选择题

In this season of celebrity babies, with the coming of Baby Suri, Tom and Katie’s new addition, and Gwyneth’s Baby Moses and the imminent arrival of Baby Brangelina, I can’t help wonder how these parents handle the insatiable public curiosity about this most profoundly personal event, as they head home from the hospital, in Tom and Katie’s case, to find seven satellite trucks parked outside, and a lemonade stand. We are used to beautiful weddings being celebrated in the pages of People and In Style, and ugly divorces scorching the pages of the tabloids. But there is something so different about childbirth that it makes me wonder whether, just this once, the famous parents should crawl into a very private hole and pull it in after them, rather than sending Diane Sawyer an e-mail telling all about it. (Maybe this is one reason Angelina Jolie was heading off to a secluded resort in Namibia as her due date approached.) A wedding can be a beautiful and blessed day; but the most perfect romance scripted into the most storybook ceremony does not have the spirit of raw astonishment that childbirth has. You are in control of your wedding; you have planned and listed and catered and crafted every detail, and if you are a celebrity you have the help of an army of event planners to make sure that the cake rises and the willows weep and everything goes according to plan. But you can’t do that with childbirth. You can eat right, practice breathing, prepare the nursery, try out names, pack the hospital bag with non-slip socks and lollipops (to keep your mouth moist) and tennis balls (for a counterpressure back massage). But this is mainly about creating the illusion of control. Once it starts, once the contractions begin, once the baby launches towards delivery, the momentum heads in the opposite direction, towards mystery, not management, and chaos, not control. However calm the doctors and however smooth the delivery, this is still a moment to marvel. It is when you feel both most unique, as though you are the first person ever to have done this, and most united with everyone else, because people have been having babies as long as there have been people. The very ordinariness of the experience is one of the most extraordinary things about it. And then you are left, belly tender, breasts leaking, veins visible from the effort, sweaty, exhausted and astounded at what you are holding. Where did YOU come from Who ARE you, you ask this very small human, who has been living with you, in you, for the past nine months and yet who now seems suddenly so new and alien and separate, her own body, her own soul. Hello. Nice to see you. Let me sing you a quiet song. There can be few more precious or private moments than this. It is not a natural place for strangers to enter, or press handlers or paparazzi. For just a little while at least, you would think a brand new little family would want more than anything to be left alone and be mammals together and feel safe, protected. I can’t imagine what it would be like to have the world waiting right outside. Maybe by the time you’ve lived under the lights this long you are used to it. But nothing can really prepare you for what it feels like to walk into a hospital as a patient and walk out as a parent. It makes a normal person feel like a celebrity: I’ve just done this incredible thing. I wonder if maybe it also makes a celebrity feel, just once, strangely normal.The last paragraph can be understood as______.

A.people have the ambivalence of being ordinary and being famous
B.everybody wants to be famous
C.people become parents when they step out of the hospital
D.celebrities are used to being centers all the time
单项选择题

Around the world, rumbles of complaint about globalization are growing louder—and these rumbles are not confined to activist movements. In East Asia, the financial crisis of 1997 left a jaundiced sense of what globalization entails, though robust economic recovery has tempered that. Globalization’s standing has also been badly damaged in Latin America by the meltdown of the Argentine economy in 2000 and financial crises in Brazil in 1999 and 2001. New fears about globalization are surfacing in Europe, too. In Poland these have taken the form of concern about foreign capital taking over the Polish banking system; takeover fears also permeate France and Italy. In France and Germany, working people link globalization with pressures to dismantle the social democratic state. Among Americans, outsourcing of service-sector jobs has become a leading concern. Opposition to free trade has crept up the income and social-strata ladder to include educated white-collar workers. This new opposition comes on top of existing resentments among blue-collar workers at the loss of well-paying manufacturing jobs. These developments have raised concerns about the durability of globalization even among its supporters. In the final section of his new book Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the 20th Century, the Harvard professor Jeffiy Frieden—who is in favor of globalization—ruminates on the possibility that today’s globalization, like that of the 19th century, might falter. It can be highly instructive to look back at what some historians call the first globalization. When people do so, however, they often tend to identify its end as the beginning of World War I in 1914. This is wrong, and leads to misunderstandings about today’s globalization. The first globalization ended with the Wall Street crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression. The world’s response to the crash, however, was profoundly affected by the political conditions that World War I had created. In the United States, Britain and France, the war created political and social conditions that fostered a turn to social democracy. In Germany, the onerous economic burdens of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles fostered a turn to Nazism. This history has enormous significance for understanding today’s predicament. The first lesson is that the economic crisis of 1929—not politics—brought down the first globalization, suggesting that an economic crisis, and not politics, will bring down today’s globalization.The second lesson is that while political developments before 1929 did not cause the crash, they mattered enormously for the international response. After World War I, governments substantially recreated the prewar economic system, but the reconstructed system distributed prosperity extremely unevenly. In the United States, wealth and income inequality grew during the "Roaring Twenties". In Britain, the industrial midlands and the north suffered from persistent stagnation because of an overvalued exchange rate. And prosperity simply bypassed Germany. Additionally, there was a popular turn to isolationism in response to the carnage wrought by the war. The global economic system was therefore unpopular, and consequently it had few defenders when the crash came. That lesson holds for the current globalization, which is also unpopular and feared. After the first globalization crashed because of inherent financial fragility, the ensuing New Deal era created a system that remedied that fragility by restricting private ownership of bullion, and creating deposit insurance and lenders of last resort. The New Deal era also created a social democratic, mass-consumption economy in which income was more broadly shared because of unionization, minimum wages and social security provisions. But such an economy is expensive for individual capitalists, giving them an incentive to evade its costs. That has been a driving force behind globalization since 1980, and that is the contradiction in today’s system. Business has an incentive to move to countries with lower costs—yet it still needs mass consumption. Today’s global economic system needs a solid middle class, but is also driven to hollow out that middle class. This contradiction has been papered over by consumer-borrowing provided by deregulated financial markets and a 25-year asset price boom. The problem is that such borrowing risks prove unsustainable if incomes are hollowed out, and that could stop the economic merry-go-round. If that stoppage produces an economic crash, globalization may crash, too. Globalization will lack political support, after being a primary cause of a hollowed-out middle class. The pattern of retreat is difficult to predict. One possibility is a return to a world of tariffs and quotas. A second response may be the emergence of regional trade and investment blocs. A third response that would preserve globalization would be the establishment of new domestic and international rules that support a social democratic, mass-consumption economy. All three scenarios challenge the international economic system that is supported by today’s global elites.The main thesis of the passage is______.

A.the major concern that globalization may fail
B.three lessons in history that globalization didn’t succeed
C.supporters’ ideas about globalization
D.whether we should insist on the idea of globalization
单项选择题

From its birth, three powerful images have coloured ideas of what the United States was and what it stood for. One was "a city on a hill", a model commonwealth for the rest of humankind. Another, in Walt Whitman’s phrase, was a "teeming nation of nations": a near-empty continent of immigration and fresh starts. A third, given currency by Alexis de Tocqueville in 1831, was of a new and exceptional kind of society not bound by prevailing rules of history. Each picture stresses what makes America different from other countries. Thomas Bender, a professor of history and humanities at New York University, wants us to focus instead on what makes the United States the same. More exactly, he is urging us to re-think key episodes in America’s past by relating them to what was happening elsewhere in the world. The United States, he suggests, is less of a nation apart than super-patriots or America-haters might want to believe. His aim is not to belittle the American achievement but to break the habit of treating it as a virtually isolated feat of self-creation. National histories, he argues, are always local responses to broader trends, and to that rule the United States is no exception. Five episodes form the core of this challenging essay. "The Ocean World" contrasts the conventional account of American beginnings, which stresses political ideals, religious freedom and economic opportunity, with a wider view that brings in sea-borne trade and slavery. Next, Mr. Bender treats the American Revolution as a by-product of the "great war" mat France and Britain fought off and on throughout the 18th century until the defeat of Napoleon in 1815. The American civil war (1861-1865) becomes part of the democratic era of nation building that began with the European revolutions of 1848. The United States did not join Europe’s scramble for empire at the end of the 19th century as a colonising power. But it fought a terrible war to control the Philippines, set a pattern of intervention in its own hemisphere and in Asia, and established a doctrine of untrammeled sea power that survives to this day. For his fifth episode, Mr. Bender likens the progressive social reforms of the 1890s onwards to changes Europeans also made to temper the free market. The breadth of view is exhilarating, and the reading daunting in scope. Mr. Bender dots his essay with awkward reminders that the American past was not a smooth, inevitable rise to superpowerdom and moral beaconhood. Yet "A Nation Among Nations" suffers from an ambiguity of aim. At several points Mr. Bender talks of a global story in which the United States has a local part. What is that story He does not say. This is not his fault. Only the rashest of historians would nowadays dream of telling us, Hegel-wise, where the spirit of world history had come from and where it was headed. Nor is gesturing towards "global trends" much help: ocean trade, nationalism and democracy, for example, are such broad categories they explain little of the local variation that puzzles us, especially when the locale is the United States, with its oddities—a high birth rate and strong religions, for example—that modern states are supposed not to have. For the rest, Mr. Bender is more modest, and more successful. American failures and successes are usually so large it is easy to forget that they are seldom unique or insulated from events elsewhere. The simple-sounding truth that the United States never was, and never could be, isolated from the world is worth repeating, and Mr. Bender repeats it well.According to the passage, the three images that describes the America does NOT include______.

A.a city on the hill, and the one that was established from barren site
B.a country that can not be typecast into any established categories
C.immigrants moving from every corner of the world and form a new country
D.the country every historian wants to decode
单项选择题

Fifty years ago, Robert Solow published the first of two papers on economic growth that eventually won him a Nobel prize. Celebrated and seasoned, he was thus a natural choice to serve on an independent "commission on growth" announced last month by the World Bank. (The commission will weigh and sift what is known about growth, and what might be done to boost it.)Natural, that is, except for anyone who takes his 1956 contribution literally. For, according to the model he laid out in that article, the efforts of policymakers to raise the rate of growth per head are ultimately futile. A government eager to force the pace of economic advance may be tempted by savings drives, tax cuts, investment subsidies or even population controls. As a result of these measures, each member of the labour force may enjoy more capital to work with. But this process of "capital deepening", as economists call it, eventually runs into diminishing returns. Giving a worker a second computer does not double his output. Accumulation alone cannot yield lasting progress, Mr. Solow showed. What can Anything that allows the economy to add to its output without necessarily adding more labour and capital. Mr. Solow labeled this font of wealth "technological progress" in 1956, and measured its importance in 1957. But in neither paper did he explain where it came from or how it could be accelerated. Invention, innovation and ingenuity were all "exogenous" influences, lying outside the remit of his theory. To practical men of action, Mr. Solow’s model was thus an impossible tease: what it illuminated did not ultimately matter; and what really mattered, it did little to illuminate. The law of diminishing returns holds great sway over the economic imagination. But its writ has not gone unchallenged. A fascinating new book, Knowledge and the Wealth of Nations by David Warsh, tells the story of the rebel economics of increasing returns. A veteran observer of dismal scientists at work, first at the Boston Globe and now in an online column called Economic Principals, Mr. Warsh has written the best book of its kind since Peter Bernstein’s Capital Ideas.Diminishing returns ensure that firms cannot grow too big, preserving competition between them. This, in turn, allows the invisible hand of the market to perform its magic. But, as Mr. Warsh makes clear, the fealty economists show to this principle is as much mathematical as philosophical. The topology of diminishing returns is easy for economists to navigate: a landscape of declining gradients and single peaks, free of the treacherous craters and crevasses that might otherwise entrap them. The hero of the second half of Mr. Warsh’s book is Paul Romer, of Stanford University, who took up the challenge ducked by Mr. Solow. If technological progress dictates economic growth, what kind of economics governs technological advance In a series of papers, culminating in an article in the Journal of Political Economy in 1990, Mr. Romer tried to make technology "endogenous", to explain it within the terms of his model. In doing so, he steered growth theory out of the comfortable cul-de-sac in which Mr. Solow had so neatly parked it. The escape required a three-point turn. First, Mr. Romer assumed that ideas were goods—of a particular kind. Ideas, unlike things, are "non-rival": Everyone can make use of a single design, recipe or blueprint at the same time. This turn in the argument led to a second: the fabrication of ideas enjoys increasing returns to scale. Expensive to produce, they are cheap, almost costless, to reproduce. Thus the total cost of a design does not change much, whether it is used by one person or by a million. Blessed with increasing returns, the manufacture of ideas might seem like a good business to go into. Actually, the opposite is true. If the business is free to enter, it is not worth doing so, because competition pares the price of a design down to the negligible cost of reproducing it. Unless idea factories can enjoy some measure of monopoly over their designs—by patenting them, copyrighting them, or just keeping them secret—they will not be able to cover the fixed cost of inventing them. That was the final turn in Mr. Romer’s new theory of growth. How much guidance do these theories offer to policymakers, such as those sitting on the World Bank’s commission In Mr. Solow’s model, according to a common caricature, technology falls like "manna from heaven", leaving the bank’s commissioners with little to do but pray. Mr. Romer’s theory, by contrast, calls for a more worldly response: educate people, subsidies their research, import ideas from abroad, carefully gauge the protection offered to intellectual property. But did policymakers need Mr. Romer’s model to reveal the importance of such things Mr. Solow has expressed doubts. Despite the caricature, he did not intend in his 1956 model to deny that innovation is often dearly bought and profit-driven. The question is whether anything useful can be said about that process at the level of the economy as a whole. That question has yet to be answered definitively. In particular, Mr. Solow worries that some of the "more powerful conclusions" of the new growth theory are unearned, flowing as they do from powerful assumptions. At one point in Mr. Warsh’s book, Mr. Romer is quoted comparing the building of economic models to writing poetry. It is a triumph of form as much as content. This creative economist did not discover anything new about the world with his 1990 paper on growth. Rather, he extended the metre and rhyme-scheme of economics to capture a world—the knowledge economy—expressed until then only in the loosest kind of doggerel. That is how economics makes progress. Sadly, it does not, in and of itself, help economies make progress.The passage can be classified into______.

A.argumentations
B.descriptions
C.comparisons
D.saga
单项选择题

In this season of celebrity babies, with the coming of Baby Suri, Tom and Katie’s new addition, and Gwyneth’s Baby Moses and the imminent arrival of Baby Brangelina, I can’t help wonder how these parents handle the insatiable public curiosity about this most profoundly personal event, as they head home from the hospital, in Tom and Katie’s case, to find seven satellite trucks parked outside, and a lemonade stand. We are used to beautiful weddings being celebrated in the pages of People and In Style, and ugly divorces scorching the pages of the tabloids. But there is something so different about childbirth that it makes me wonder whether, just this once, the famous parents should crawl into a very private hole and pull it in after them, rather than sending Diane Sawyer an e-mail telling all about it. (Maybe this is one reason Angelina Jolie was heading off to a secluded resort in Namibia as her due date approached.) A wedding can be a beautiful and blessed day; but the most perfect romance scripted into the most storybook ceremony does not have the spirit of raw astonishment that childbirth has. You are in control of your wedding; you have planned and listed and catered and crafted every detail, and if you are a celebrity you have the help of an army of event planners to make sure that the cake rises and the willows weep and everything goes according to plan. But you can’t do that with childbirth. You can eat right, practice breathing, prepare the nursery, try out names, pack the hospital bag with non-slip socks and lollipops (to keep your mouth moist) and tennis balls (for a counterpressure back massage). But this is mainly about creating the illusion of control. Once it starts, once the contractions begin, once the baby launches towards delivery, the momentum heads in the opposite direction, towards mystery, not management, and chaos, not control. However calm the doctors and however smooth the delivery, this is still a moment to marvel. It is when you feel both most unique, as though you are the first person ever to have done this, and most united with everyone else, because people have been having babies as long as there have been people. The very ordinariness of the experience is one of the most extraordinary things about it. And then you are left, belly tender, breasts leaking, veins visible from the effort, sweaty, exhausted and astounded at what you are holding. Where did YOU come from Who ARE you, you ask this very small human, who has been living with you, in you, for the past nine months and yet who now seems suddenly so new and alien and separate, her own body, her own soul. Hello. Nice to see you. Let me sing you a quiet song. There can be few more precious or private moments than this. It is not a natural place for strangers to enter, or press handlers or paparazzi. For just a little while at least, you would think a brand new little family would want more than anything to be left alone and be mammals together and feel safe, protected. I can’t imagine what it would be like to have the world waiting right outside. Maybe by the time you’ve lived under the lights this long you are used to it. But nothing can really prepare you for what it feels like to walk into a hospital as a patient and walk out as a parent. It makes a normal person feel like a celebrity: I’ve just done this incredible thing. I wonder if maybe it also makes a celebrity feel, just once, strangely normal.The best title of the passage is______.

A.Giving Birth to Entertainment Tonight
B.Weddings and Labor Pains
C.Tips to Famous Pregnant Women
D.How to Enjoy Freedom While Being a Celebrity
单项选择题

Around the world, rumbles of complaint about globalization are growing louder—and these rumbles are not confined to activist movements. In East Asia, the financial crisis of 1997 left a jaundiced sense of what globalization entails, though robust economic recovery has tempered that. Globalization’s standing has also been badly damaged in Latin America by the meltdown of the Argentine economy in 2000 and financial crises in Brazil in 1999 and 2001. New fears about globalization are surfacing in Europe, too. In Poland these have taken the form of concern about foreign capital taking over the Polish banking system; takeover fears also permeate France and Italy. In France and Germany, working people link globalization with pressures to dismantle the social democratic state. Among Americans, outsourcing of service-sector jobs has become a leading concern. Opposition to free trade has crept up the income and social-strata ladder to include educated white-collar workers. This new opposition comes on top of existing resentments among blue-collar workers at the loss of well-paying manufacturing jobs. These developments have raised concerns about the durability of globalization even among its supporters. In the final section of his new book Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the 20th Century, the Harvard professor Jeffiy Frieden—who is in favor of globalization—ruminates on the possibility that today’s globalization, like that of the 19th century, might falter. It can be highly instructive to look back at what some historians call the first globalization. When people do so, however, they often tend to identify its end as the beginning of World War I in 1914. This is wrong, and leads to misunderstandings about today’s globalization. The first globalization ended with the Wall Street crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression. The world’s response to the crash, however, was profoundly affected by the political conditions that World War I had created. In the United States, Britain and France, the war created political and social conditions that fostered a turn to social democracy. In Germany, the onerous economic burdens of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles fostered a turn to Nazism. This history has enormous significance for understanding today’s predicament. The first lesson is that the economic crisis of 1929—not politics—brought down the first globalization, suggesting that an economic crisis, and not politics, will bring down today’s globalization.The second lesson is that while political developments before 1929 did not cause the crash, they mattered enormously for the international response. After World War I, governments substantially recreated the prewar economic system, but the reconstructed system distributed prosperity extremely unevenly. In the United States, wealth and income inequality grew during the "Roaring Twenties". In Britain, the industrial midlands and the north suffered from persistent stagnation because of an overvalued exchange rate. And prosperity simply bypassed Germany. Additionally, there was a popular turn to isolationism in response to the carnage wrought by the war. The global economic system was therefore unpopular, and consequently it had few defenders when the crash came. That lesson holds for the current globalization, which is also unpopular and feared. After the first globalization crashed because of inherent financial fragility, the ensuing New Deal era created a system that remedied that fragility by restricting private ownership of bullion, and creating deposit insurance and lenders of last resort. The New Deal era also created a social democratic, mass-consumption economy in which income was more broadly shared because of unionization, minimum wages and social security provisions. But such an economy is expensive for individual capitalists, giving them an incentive to evade its costs. That has been a driving force behind globalization since 1980, and that is the contradiction in today’s system. Business has an incentive to move to countries with lower costs—yet it still needs mass consumption. Today’s global economic system needs a solid middle class, but is also driven to hollow out that middle class. This contradiction has been papered over by consumer-borrowing provided by deregulated financial markets and a 25-year asset price boom. The problem is that such borrowing risks prove unsustainable if incomes are hollowed out, and that could stop the economic merry-go-round. If that stoppage produces an economic crash, globalization may crash, too. Globalization will lack political support, after being a primary cause of a hollowed-out middle class. The pattern of retreat is difficult to predict. One possibility is a return to a world of tariffs and quotas. A second response may be the emergence of regional trade and investment blocs. A third response that would preserve globalization would be the establishment of new domestic and international rules that support a social democratic, mass-consumption economy. All three scenarios challenge the international economic system that is supported by today’s global elites.Which of the following descriptions is NOT true

A.The first try of globalization end as the beginning of World War I in 1914.
B.New fears about globalization are surfacing in Europe
C.Business in countries with lower costs also needs mass consumption.
D.Britain have experienced the "Roaring Twenties."
单项选择题

From its birth, three powerful images have coloured ideas of what the United States was and what it stood for. One was "a city on a hill", a model commonwealth for the rest of humankind. Another, in Walt Whitman’s phrase, was a "teeming nation of nations": a near-empty continent of immigration and fresh starts. A third, given currency by Alexis de Tocqueville in 1831, was of a new and exceptional kind of society not bound by prevailing rules of history. Each picture stresses what makes America different from other countries. Thomas Bender, a professor of history and humanities at New York University, wants us to focus instead on what makes the United States the same. More exactly, he is urging us to re-think key episodes in America’s past by relating them to what was happening elsewhere in the world. The United States, he suggests, is less of a nation apart than super-patriots or America-haters might want to believe. His aim is not to belittle the American achievement but to break the habit of treating it as a virtually isolated feat of self-creation. National histories, he argues, are always local responses to broader trends, and to that rule the United States is no exception. Five episodes form the core of this challenging essay. "The Ocean World" contrasts the conventional account of American beginnings, which stresses political ideals, religious freedom and economic opportunity, with a wider view that brings in sea-borne trade and slavery. Next, Mr. Bender treats the American Revolution as a by-product of the "great war" mat France and Britain fought off and on throughout the 18th century until the defeat of Napoleon in 1815. The American civil war (1861-1865) becomes part of the democratic era of nation building that began with the European revolutions of 1848. The United States did not join Europe’s scramble for empire at the end of the 19th century as a colonising power. But it fought a terrible war to control the Philippines, set a pattern of intervention in its own hemisphere and in Asia, and established a doctrine of untrammeled sea power that survives to this day. For his fifth episode, Mr. Bender likens the progressive social reforms of the 1890s onwards to changes Europeans also made to temper the free market. The breadth of view is exhilarating, and the reading daunting in scope. Mr. Bender dots his essay with awkward reminders that the American past was not a smooth, inevitable rise to superpowerdom and moral beaconhood. Yet "A Nation Among Nations" suffers from an ambiguity of aim. At several points Mr. Bender talks of a global story in which the United States has a local part. What is that story He does not say. This is not his fault. Only the rashest of historians would nowadays dream of telling us, Hegel-wise, where the spirit of world history had come from and where it was headed. Nor is gesturing towards "global trends" much help: ocean trade, nationalism and democracy, for example, are such broad categories they explain little of the local variation that puzzles us, especially when the locale is the United States, with its oddities—a high birth rate and strong religions, for example—that modern states are supposed not to have. For the rest, Mr. Bender is more modest, and more successful. American failures and successes are usually so large it is easy to forget that they are seldom unique or insulated from events elsewhere. The simple-sounding truth that the United States never was, and never could be, isolated from the world is worth repeating, and Mr. Bender repeats it well.The five episodes quoted do NOT include the episode that______.

A.lays emphasis on political ideals, religious freedom and economic opportunity, with a wider view that brings in sea-borne trade and slavery
B.compares the civil war to the European revolutions in 1848
C.describes Philippine war
D.likens the political reforms of the 1890s onwards to Europeans adoptions of tempering the free market.
单项选择题

Fifty years ago, Robert Solow published the first of two papers on economic growth that eventually won him a Nobel prize. Celebrated and seasoned, he was thus a natural choice to serve on an independent "commission on growth" announced last month by the World Bank. (The commission will weigh and sift what is known about growth, and what might be done to boost it.)Natural, that is, except for anyone who takes his 1956 contribution literally. For, according to the model he laid out in that article, the efforts of policymakers to raise the rate of growth per head are ultimately futile. A government eager to force the pace of economic advance may be tempted by savings drives, tax cuts, investment subsidies or even population controls. As a result of these measures, each member of the labour force may enjoy more capital to work with. But this process of "capital deepening", as economists call it, eventually runs into diminishing returns. Giving a worker a second computer does not double his output. Accumulation alone cannot yield lasting progress, Mr. Solow showed. What can Anything that allows the economy to add to its output without necessarily adding more labour and capital. Mr. Solow labeled this font of wealth "technological progress" in 1956, and measured its importance in 1957. But in neither paper did he explain where it came from or how it could be accelerated. Invention, innovation and ingenuity were all "exogenous" influences, lying outside the remit of his theory. To practical men of action, Mr. Solow’s model was thus an impossible tease: what it illuminated did not ultimately matter; and what really mattered, it did little to illuminate. The law of diminishing returns holds great sway over the economic imagination. But its writ has not gone unchallenged. A fascinating new book, Knowledge and the Wealth of Nations by David Warsh, tells the story of the rebel economics of increasing returns. A veteran observer of dismal scientists at work, first at the Boston Globe and now in an online column called Economic Principals, Mr. Warsh has written the best book of its kind since Peter Bernstein’s Capital Ideas.Diminishing returns ensure that firms cannot grow too big, preserving competition between them. This, in turn, allows the invisible hand of the market to perform its magic. But, as Mr. Warsh makes clear, the fealty economists show to this principle is as much mathematical as philosophical. The topology of diminishing returns is easy for economists to navigate: a landscape of declining gradients and single peaks, free of the treacherous craters and crevasses that might otherwise entrap them. The hero of the second half of Mr. Warsh’s book is Paul Romer, of Stanford University, who took up the challenge ducked by Mr. Solow. If technological progress dictates economic growth, what kind of economics governs technological advance In a series of papers, culminating in an article in the Journal of Political Economy in 1990, Mr. Romer tried to make technology "endogenous", to explain it within the terms of his model. In doing so, he steered growth theory out of the comfortable cul-de-sac in which Mr. Solow had so neatly parked it. The escape required a three-point turn. First, Mr. Romer assumed that ideas were goods—of a particular kind. Ideas, unlike things, are "non-rival": Everyone can make use of a single design, recipe or blueprint at the same time. This turn in the argument led to a second: the fabrication of ideas enjoys increasing returns to scale. Expensive to produce, they are cheap, almost costless, to reproduce. Thus the total cost of a design does not change much, whether it is used by one person or by a million. Blessed with increasing returns, the manufacture of ideas might seem like a good business to go into. Actually, the opposite is true. If the business is free to enter, it is not worth doing so, because competition pares the price of a design down to the negligible cost of reproducing it. Unless idea factories can enjoy some measure of monopoly over their designs—by patenting them, copyrighting them, or just keeping them secret—they will not be able to cover the fixed cost of inventing them. That was the final turn in Mr. Romer’s new theory of growth. How much guidance do these theories offer to policymakers, such as those sitting on the World Bank’s commission In Mr. Solow’s model, according to a common caricature, technology falls like "manna from heaven", leaving the bank’s commissioners with little to do but pray. Mr. Romer’s theory, by contrast, calls for a more worldly response: educate people, subsidies their research, import ideas from abroad, carefully gauge the protection offered to intellectual property. But did policymakers need Mr. Romer’s model to reveal the importance of such things Mr. Solow has expressed doubts. Despite the caricature, he did not intend in his 1956 model to deny that innovation is often dearly bought and profit-driven. The question is whether anything useful can be said about that process at the level of the economy as a whole. That question has yet to be answered definitively. In particular, Mr. Solow worries that some of the "more powerful conclusions" of the new growth theory are unearned, flowing as they do from powerful assumptions. At one point in Mr. Warsh’s book, Mr. Romer is quoted comparing the building of economic models to writing poetry. It is a triumph of form as much as content. This creative economist did not discover anything new about the world with his 1990 paper on growth. Rather, he extended the metre and rhyme-scheme of economics to capture a world—the knowledge economy—expressed until then only in the loosest kind of doggerel. That is how economics makes progress. Sadly, it does not, in and of itself, help economies make progress.The expression "manna from heaven" (Para. 11) can be best replaced by______.

A.disaster
B.unexpected benefit
C.illusion
D.common sense
单项选择题

Around the world, rumbles of complaint about globalization are growing louder—and these rumbles are not confined to activist movements. In East Asia, the financial crisis of 1997 left a jaundiced sense of what globalization entails, though robust economic recovery has tempered that. Globalization’s standing has also been badly damaged in Latin America by the meltdown of the Argentine economy in 2000 and financial crises in Brazil in 1999 and 2001. New fears about globalization are surfacing in Europe, too. In Poland these have taken the form of concern about foreign capital taking over the Polish banking system; takeover fears also permeate France and Italy. In France and Germany, working people link globalization with pressures to dismantle the social democratic state. Among Americans, outsourcing of service-sector jobs has become a leading concern. Opposition to free trade has crept up the income and social-strata ladder to include educated white-collar workers. This new opposition comes on top of existing resentments among blue-collar workers at the loss of well-paying manufacturing jobs. These developments have raised concerns about the durability of globalization even among its supporters. In the final section of his new book Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the 20th Century, the Harvard professor Jeffiy Frieden—who is in favor of globalization—ruminates on the possibility that today’s globalization, like that of the 19th century, might falter. It can be highly instructive to look back at what some historians call the first globalization. When people do so, however, they often tend to identify its end as the beginning of World War I in 1914. This is wrong, and leads to misunderstandings about today’s globalization. The first globalization ended with the Wall Street crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression. The world’s response to the crash, however, was profoundly affected by the political conditions that World War I had created. In the United States, Britain and France, the war created political and social conditions that fostered a turn to social democracy. In Germany, the onerous economic burdens of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles fostered a turn to Nazism. This history has enormous significance for understanding today’s predicament. The first lesson is that the economic crisis of 1929—not politics—brought down the first globalization, suggesting that an economic crisis, and not politics, will bring down today’s globalization.The second lesson is that while political developments before 1929 did not cause the crash, they mattered enormously for the international response. After World War I, governments substantially recreated the prewar economic system, but the reconstructed system distributed prosperity extremely unevenly. In the United States, wealth and income inequality grew during the "Roaring Twenties". In Britain, the industrial midlands and the north suffered from persistent stagnation because of an overvalued exchange rate. And prosperity simply bypassed Germany. Additionally, there was a popular turn to isolationism in response to the carnage wrought by the war. The global economic system was therefore unpopular, and consequently it had few defenders when the crash came. That lesson holds for the current globalization, which is also unpopular and feared. After the first globalization crashed because of inherent financial fragility, the ensuing New Deal era created a system that remedied that fragility by restricting private ownership of bullion, and creating deposit insurance and lenders of last resort. The New Deal era also created a social democratic, mass-consumption economy in which income was more broadly shared because of unionization, minimum wages and social security provisions. But such an economy is expensive for individual capitalists, giving them an incentive to evade its costs. That has been a driving force behind globalization since 1980, and that is the contradiction in today’s system. Business has an incentive to move to countries with lower costs—yet it still needs mass consumption. Today’s global economic system needs a solid middle class, but is also driven to hollow out that middle class. This contradiction has been papered over by consumer-borrowing provided by deregulated financial markets and a 25-year asset price boom. The problem is that such borrowing risks prove unsustainable if incomes are hollowed out, and that could stop the economic merry-go-round. If that stoppage produces an economic crash, globalization may crash, too. Globalization will lack political support, after being a primary cause of a hollowed-out middle class. The pattern of retreat is difficult to predict. One possibility is a return to a world of tariffs and quotas. A second response may be the emergence of regional trade and investment blocs. A third response that would preserve globalization would be the establishment of new domestic and international rules that support a social democratic, mass-consumption economy. All three scenarios challenge the international economic system that is supported by today’s global elites.According to the passage, which of the following is true about complaints towards globalization

A.There are activist movements against globalization
B.East Asians have always feared the Financial Crises since the 97-98 fallout.
C.Business in countries with lower costs does not need mass consumption.
D.In America, the fear of globalization focuses on the taking over of banking system.
单项选择题

From its birth, three powerful images have coloured ideas of what the United States was and what it stood for. One was "a city on a hill", a model commonwealth for the rest of humankind. Another, in Walt Whitman’s phrase, was a "teeming nation of nations": a near-empty continent of immigration and fresh starts. A third, given currency by Alexis de Tocqueville in 1831, was of a new and exceptional kind of society not bound by prevailing rules of history. Each picture stresses what makes America different from other countries. Thomas Bender, a professor of history and humanities at New York University, wants us to focus instead on what makes the United States the same. More exactly, he is urging us to re-think key episodes in America’s past by relating them to what was happening elsewhere in the world. The United States, he suggests, is less of a nation apart than super-patriots or America-haters might want to believe. His aim is not to belittle the American achievement but to break the habit of treating it as a virtually isolated feat of self-creation. National histories, he argues, are always local responses to broader trends, and to that rule the United States is no exception. Five episodes form the core of this challenging essay. "The Ocean World" contrasts the conventional account of American beginnings, which stresses political ideals, religious freedom and economic opportunity, with a wider view that brings in sea-borne trade and slavery. Next, Mr. Bender treats the American Revolution as a by-product of the "great war" mat France and Britain fought off and on throughout the 18th century until the defeat of Napoleon in 1815. The American civil war (1861-1865) becomes part of the democratic era of nation building that began with the European revolutions of 1848. The United States did not join Europe’s scramble for empire at the end of the 19th century as a colonising power. But it fought a terrible war to control the Philippines, set a pattern of intervention in its own hemisphere and in Asia, and established a doctrine of untrammeled sea power that survives to this day. For his fifth episode, Mr. Bender likens the progressive social reforms of the 1890s onwards to changes Europeans also made to temper the free market. The breadth of view is exhilarating, and the reading daunting in scope. Mr. Bender dots his essay with awkward reminders that the American past was not a smooth, inevitable rise to superpowerdom and moral beaconhood. Yet "A Nation Among Nations" suffers from an ambiguity of aim. At several points Mr. Bender talks of a global story in which the United States has a local part. What is that story He does not say. This is not his fault. Only the rashest of historians would nowadays dream of telling us, Hegel-wise, where the spirit of world history had come from and where it was headed. Nor is gesturing towards "global trends" much help: ocean trade, nationalism and democracy, for example, are such broad categories they explain little of the local variation that puzzles us, especially when the locale is the United States, with its oddities—a high birth rate and strong religions, for example—that modern states are supposed not to have. For the rest, Mr. Bender is more modest, and more successful. American failures and successes are usually so large it is easy to forget that they are seldom unique or insulated from events elsewhere. The simple-sounding truth that the United States never was, and never could be, isolated from the world is worth repeating, and Mr. Bender repeats it well.What is the author’s attitude towards Mr. Bender’s book

A.Admiring.
B.Impartial.
C.No comments.
D.Attacking.
单项选择题

Around the world, rumbles of complaint about globalization are growing louder—and these rumbles are not confined to activist movements. In East Asia, the financial crisis of 1997 left a jaundiced sense of what globalization entails, though robust economic recovery has tempered that. Globalization’s standing has also been badly damaged in Latin America by the meltdown of the Argentine economy in 2000 and financial crises in Brazil in 1999 and 2001. New fears about globalization are surfacing in Europe, too. In Poland these have taken the form of concern about foreign capital taking over the Polish banking system; takeover fears also permeate France and Italy. In France and Germany, working people link globalization with pressures to dismantle the social democratic state. Among Americans, outsourcing of service-sector jobs has become a leading concern. Opposition to free trade has crept up the income and social-strata ladder to include educated white-collar workers. This new opposition comes on top of existing resentments among blue-collar workers at the loss of well-paying manufacturing jobs. These developments have raised concerns about the durability of globalization even among its supporters. In the final section of his new book Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the 20th Century, the Harvard professor Jeffiy Frieden—who is in favor of globalization—ruminates on the possibility that today’s globalization, like that of the 19th century, might falter. It can be highly instructive to look back at what some historians call the first globalization. When people do so, however, they often tend to identify its end as the beginning of World War I in 1914. This is wrong, and leads to misunderstandings about today’s globalization. The first globalization ended with the Wall Street crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression. The world’s response to the crash, however, was profoundly affected by the political conditions that World War I had created. In the United States, Britain and France, the war created political and social conditions that fostered a turn to social democracy. In Germany, the onerous economic burdens of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles fostered a turn to Nazism. This history has enormous significance for understanding today’s predicament. The first lesson is that the economic crisis of 1929—not politics—brought down the first globalization, suggesting that an economic crisis, and not politics, will bring down today’s globalization.The second lesson is that while political developments before 1929 did not cause the crash, they mattered enormously for the international response. After World War I, governments substantially recreated the prewar economic system, but the reconstructed system distributed prosperity extremely unevenly. In the United States, wealth and income inequality grew during the "Roaring Twenties". In Britain, the industrial midlands and the north suffered from persistent stagnation because of an overvalued exchange rate. And prosperity simply bypassed Germany. Additionally, there was a popular turn to isolationism in response to the carnage wrought by the war. The global economic system was therefore unpopular, and consequently it had few defenders when the crash came. That lesson holds for the current globalization, which is also unpopular and feared. After the first globalization crashed because of inherent financial fragility, the ensuing New Deal era created a system that remedied that fragility by restricting private ownership of bullion, and creating deposit insurance and lenders of last resort. The New Deal era also created a social democratic, mass-consumption economy in which income was more broadly shared because of unionization, minimum wages and social security provisions. But such an economy is expensive for individual capitalists, giving them an incentive to evade its costs. That has been a driving force behind globalization since 1980, and that is the contradiction in today’s system. Business has an incentive to move to countries with lower costs—yet it still needs mass consumption. Today’s global economic system needs a solid middle class, but is also driven to hollow out that middle class. This contradiction has been papered over by consumer-borrowing provided by deregulated financial markets and a 25-year asset price boom. The problem is that such borrowing risks prove unsustainable if incomes are hollowed out, and that could stop the economic merry-go-round. If that stoppage produces an economic crash, globalization may crash, too. Globalization will lack political support, after being a primary cause of a hollowed-out middle class. The pattern of retreat is difficult to predict. One possibility is a return to a world of tariffs and quotas. A second response may be the emergence of regional trade and investment blocs. A third response that would preserve globalization would be the establishment of new domestic and international rules that support a social democratic, mass-consumption economy. All three scenarios challenge the international economic system that is supported by today’s global elites."Merry-go-round" (Para. 12) can be best replaced by______.

A.a game played by kids
B.boom
C.a series of burning cyclical events
D.taking measures
单项选择题

Fifty years ago, Robert Solow published the first of two papers on economic growth that eventually won him a Nobel prize. Celebrated and seasoned, he was thus a natural choice to serve on an independent "commission on growth" announced last month by the World Bank. (The commission will weigh and sift what is known about growth, and what might be done to boost it.)Natural, that is, except for anyone who takes his 1956 contribution literally. For, according to the model he laid out in that article, the efforts of policymakers to raise the rate of growth per head are ultimately futile. A government eager to force the pace of economic advance may be tempted by savings drives, tax cuts, investment subsidies or even population controls. As a result of these measures, each member of the labour force may enjoy more capital to work with. But this process of "capital deepening", as economists call it, eventually runs into diminishing returns. Giving a worker a second computer does not double his output. Accumulation alone cannot yield lasting progress, Mr. Solow showed. What can Anything that allows the economy to add to its output without necessarily adding more labour and capital. Mr. Solow labeled this font of wealth "technological progress" in 1956, and measured its importance in 1957. But in neither paper did he explain where it came from or how it could be accelerated. Invention, innovation and ingenuity were all "exogenous" influences, lying outside the remit of his theory. To practical men of action, Mr. Solow’s model was thus an impossible tease: what it illuminated did not ultimately matter; and what really mattered, it did little to illuminate. The law of diminishing returns holds great sway over the economic imagination. But its writ has not gone unchallenged. A fascinating new book, Knowledge and the Wealth of Nations by David Warsh, tells the story of the rebel economics of increasing returns. A veteran observer of dismal scientists at work, first at the Boston Globe and now in an online column called Economic Principals, Mr. Warsh has written the best book of its kind since Peter Bernstein’s Capital Ideas.Diminishing returns ensure that firms cannot grow too big, preserving competition between them. This, in turn, allows the invisible hand of the market to perform its magic. But, as Mr. Warsh makes clear, the fealty economists show to this principle is as much mathematical as philosophical. The topology of diminishing returns is easy for economists to navigate: a landscape of declining gradients and single peaks, free of the treacherous craters and crevasses that might otherwise entrap them. The hero of the second half of Mr. Warsh’s book is Paul Romer, of Stanford University, who took up the challenge ducked by Mr. Solow. If technological progress dictates economic growth, what kind of economics governs technological advance In a series of papers, culminating in an article in the Journal of Political Economy in 1990, Mr. Romer tried to make technology "endogenous", to explain it within the terms of his model. In doing so, he steered growth theory out of the comfortable cul-de-sac in which Mr. Solow had so neatly parked it. The escape required a three-point turn. First, Mr. Romer assumed that ideas were goods—of a particular kind. Ideas, unlike things, are "non-rival": Everyone can make use of a single design, recipe or blueprint at the same time. This turn in the argument led to a second: the fabrication of ideas enjoys increasing returns to scale. Expensive to produce, they are cheap, almost costless, to reproduce. Thus the total cost of a design does not change much, whether it is used by one person or by a million. Blessed with increasing returns, the manufacture of ideas might seem like a good business to go into. Actually, the opposite is true. If the business is free to enter, it is not worth doing so, because competition pares the price of a design down to the negligible cost of reproducing it. Unless idea factories can enjoy some measure of monopoly over their designs—by patenting them, copyrighting them, or just keeping them secret—they will not be able to cover the fixed cost of inventing them. That was the final turn in Mr. Romer’s new theory of growth. How much guidance do these theories offer to policymakers, such as those sitting on the World Bank’s commission In Mr. Solow’s model, according to a common caricature, technology falls like "manna from heaven", leaving the bank’s commissioners with little to do but pray. Mr. Romer’s theory, by contrast, calls for a more worldly response: educate people, subsidies their research, import ideas from abroad, carefully gauge the protection offered to intellectual property. But did policymakers need Mr. Romer’s model to reveal the importance of such things Mr. Solow has expressed doubts. Despite the caricature, he did not intend in his 1956 model to deny that innovation is often dearly bought and profit-driven. The question is whether anything useful can be said about that process at the level of the economy as a whole. That question has yet to be answered definitively. In particular, Mr. Solow worries that some of the "more powerful conclusions" of the new growth theory are unearned, flowing as they do from powerful assumptions. At one point in Mr. Warsh’s book, Mr. Romer is quoted comparing the building of economic models to writing poetry. It is a triumph of form as much as content. This creative economist did not discover anything new about the world with his 1990 paper on growth. Rather, he extended the metre and rhyme-scheme of economics to capture a world—the knowledge economy—expressed until then only in the loosest kind of doggerel. That is how economics makes progress. Sadly, it does not, in and of itself, help economies make progress.Which of the following statements is true according to the passage

A.A government eager to force the pace of economic advance may encourage savings, cut taxes, grant investment subsidies or even population control.
B.The new book Knowledge and the Wealth of Nations challenges the law of diminishing returns.
C.Neither the book Knowledge and the Wealth of Nations nor Mr. Solow’s theory is grounded.
D.Mr. Solow has expressed insistence that policymakers need Mr. Romer’s model.
单项选择题

From its birth, three powerful images have coloured ideas of what the United States was and what it stood for. One was "a city on a hill", a model commonwealth for the rest of humankind. Another, in Walt Whitman’s phrase, was a "teeming nation of nations": a near-empty continent of immigration and fresh starts. A third, given currency by Alexis de Tocqueville in 1831, was of a new and exceptional kind of society not bound by prevailing rules of history. Each picture stresses what makes America different from other countries. Thomas Bender, a professor of history and humanities at New York University, wants us to focus instead on what makes the United States the same. More exactly, he is urging us to re-think key episodes in America’s past by relating them to what was happening elsewhere in the world. The United States, he suggests, is less of a nation apart than super-patriots or America-haters might want to believe. His aim is not to belittle the American achievement but to break the habit of treating it as a virtually isolated feat of self-creation. National histories, he argues, are always local responses to broader trends, and to that rule the United States is no exception. Five episodes form the core of this challenging essay. "The Ocean World" contrasts the conventional account of American beginnings, which stresses political ideals, religious freedom and economic opportunity, with a wider view that brings in sea-borne trade and slavery. Next, Mr. Bender treats the American Revolution as a by-product of the "great war" mat France and Britain fought off and on throughout the 18th century until the defeat of Napoleon in 1815. The American civil war (1861-1865) becomes part of the democratic era of nation building that began with the European revolutions of 1848. The United States did not join Europe’s scramble for empire at the end of the 19th century as a colonising power. But it fought a terrible war to control the Philippines, set a pattern of intervention in its own hemisphere and in Asia, and established a doctrine of untrammeled sea power that survives to this day. For his fifth episode, Mr. Bender likens the progressive social reforms of the 1890s onwards to changes Europeans also made to temper the free market. The breadth of view is exhilarating, and the reading daunting in scope. Mr. Bender dots his essay with awkward reminders that the American past was not a smooth, inevitable rise to superpowerdom and moral beaconhood. Yet "A Nation Among Nations" suffers from an ambiguity of aim. At several points Mr. Bender talks of a global story in which the United States has a local part. What is that story He does not say. This is not his fault. Only the rashest of historians would nowadays dream of telling us, Hegel-wise, where the spirit of world history had come from and where it was headed. Nor is gesturing towards "global trends" much help: ocean trade, nationalism and democracy, for example, are such broad categories they explain little of the local variation that puzzles us, especially when the locale is the United States, with its oddities—a high birth rate and strong religions, for example—that modern states are supposed not to have. For the rest, Mr. Bender is more modest, and more successful. American failures and successes are usually so large it is easy to forget that they are seldom unique or insulated from events elsewhere. The simple-sounding truth that the United States never was, and never could be, isolated from the world is worth repeating, and Mr. Bender repeats it well.The word "currency" (Para. 1) can be best replaced by______.

A.term
B.story
C.painting
D.phrase
单项选择题

Around the world, rumbles of complaint about globalization are growing louder—and these rumbles are not confined to activist movements. In East Asia, the financial crisis of 1997 left a jaundiced sense of what globalization entails, though robust economic recovery has tempered that. Globalization’s standing has also been badly damaged in Latin America by the meltdown of the Argentine economy in 2000 and financial crises in Brazil in 1999 and 2001. New fears about globalization are surfacing in Europe, too. In Poland these have taken the form of concern about foreign capital taking over the Polish banking system; takeover fears also permeate France and Italy. In France and Germany, working people link globalization with pressures to dismantle the social democratic state. Among Americans, outsourcing of service-sector jobs has become a leading concern. Opposition to free trade has crept up the income and social-strata ladder to include educated white-collar workers. This new opposition comes on top of existing resentments among blue-collar workers at the loss of well-paying manufacturing jobs. These developments have raised concerns about the durability of globalization even among its supporters. In the final section of his new book Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the 20th Century, the Harvard professor Jeffiy Frieden—who is in favor of globalization—ruminates on the possibility that today’s globalization, like that of the 19th century, might falter. It can be highly instructive to look back at what some historians call the first globalization. When people do so, however, they often tend to identify its end as the beginning of World War I in 1914. This is wrong, and leads to misunderstandings about today’s globalization. The first globalization ended with the Wall Street crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression. The world’s response to the crash, however, was profoundly affected by the political conditions that World War I had created. In the United States, Britain and France, the war created political and social conditions that fostered a turn to social democracy. In Germany, the onerous economic burdens of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles fostered a turn to Nazism. This history has enormous significance for understanding today’s predicament. The first lesson is that the economic crisis of 1929—not politics—brought down the first globalization, suggesting that an economic crisis, and not politics, will bring down today’s globalization.The second lesson is that while political developments before 1929 did not cause the crash, they mattered enormously for the international response. After World War I, governments substantially recreated the prewar economic system, but the reconstructed system distributed prosperity extremely unevenly. In the United States, wealth and income inequality grew during the "Roaring Twenties". In Britain, the industrial midlands and the north suffered from persistent stagnation because of an overvalued exchange rate. And prosperity simply bypassed Germany. Additionally, there was a popular turn to isolationism in response to the carnage wrought by the war. The global economic system was therefore unpopular, and consequently it had few defenders when the crash came. That lesson holds for the current globalization, which is also unpopular and feared. After the first globalization crashed because of inherent financial fragility, the ensuing New Deal era created a system that remedied that fragility by restricting private ownership of bullion, and creating deposit insurance and lenders of last resort. The New Deal era also created a social democratic, mass-consumption economy in which income was more broadly shared because of unionization, minimum wages and social security provisions. But such an economy is expensive for individual capitalists, giving them an incentive to evade its costs. That has been a driving force behind globalization since 1980, and that is the contradiction in today’s system. Business has an incentive to move to countries with lower costs—yet it still needs mass consumption. Today’s global economic system needs a solid middle class, but is also driven to hollow out that middle class. This contradiction has been papered over by consumer-borrowing provided by deregulated financial markets and a 25-year asset price boom. The problem is that such borrowing risks prove unsustainable if incomes are hollowed out, and that could stop the economic merry-go-round. If that stoppage produces an economic crash, globalization may crash, too. Globalization will lack political support, after being a primary cause of a hollowed-out middle class. The pattern of retreat is difficult to predict. One possibility is a return to a world of tariffs and quotas. A second response may be the emergence of regional trade and investment blocs. A third response that would preserve globalization would be the establishment of new domestic and international rules that support a social democratic, mass-consumption economy. All three scenarios challenge the international economic system that is supported by today’s global elites."Hollowed-out" (Para. 12) can be best paraphrased by______.

A.cannular
B.solid
C.taken away most of their property
D.unhappy
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